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energy consumption combined with a low level of security of supply. Based on the above matrix, these countries 
should review their security of supply situation and evaluate what can be done to improve their levels. Analysis of 
the situation anticipated by 2030 and by 2050 indicates that several countries could join the high-impact and high-
risk quadrant of the matrix, particularly those that are presently reliant upon domestic production to meet part of 
their consumption, if nothing is done to address the issues of supply diversification and decreasing indigenous 
production. Turning to supply diversification, Figure 5 shows how much imports from Russia contribute to the 
overall gas supply of individual European countries. Specifically, it shows several countries are highly dependent on 
Russian supply and remain insufficiently diversified. Countries with more developed gas markets appear to have 
greater diversification. 
Figure 5. European dependence on Russian gas 
 
 
1.4 Investment  delay 
The recession and recent decrease in investment projects throughout the EU threatens its future security of supply. 
Investments in major gas infrastructure needed to increase the overall level of security of supply on a regional level 
are capital intensive and take years of planning to complete. Putting off decisions now will guarantee negative future 
impacts.   
1.5  Uncertainty in projections 
Another threat to natural gas security of supply is the considerable uncertainty regarding future projections of natural 
gas demand in the EU. Differing sets of EU demand and domestic production estimates in the long term create 
unnecessary yet wide-ranging uncertainty among both producers and consumers regarding their energy consumption 
and thus future import requirements. Such discrepancies and differences in estimates of EU import requirements 
could prove problematic for exporting countries, which require accurate information in order to maintain the 
appropriate investments and energy strategies. The range of the EU's gas import requirement estimates for 2030, 
drawn from the forecasts of several institutions, is very broad. Attention should be drawn to the profound 
implications of these differing estimates and their eventual consequences in the execution of EU energy policies. A 
more than expected decline in EU domestic gas production will translate into a higher gas deficit and hence greater 
import dependency, which would require a greater-than-planned launch of new EU gas transport infrastructure.   
1.6 Technical  risks 
Research in the context of the SECURE project found that technical risks of gas disruption were not a considerable 
threat to the EU's gas supply security, but that technical restrictions such as a lack of reverse flow in some parts of Security of Europe’s Gas Supply: EU Vulnerability | 5 
the gas system were. Lack of reverse flow disables the single gas market and stops gas from flowing to areas where 
it is needed. In particular, gas flow is lacking from Western Europe to Eastern Europe.  
1.7  Evolution of demand/climate targets 
It should be kept in mind that much of the uncertainty about the EU’s future natural gas import requirements will 
depend on the evolution of electricity generation from gas-fired power plants. Market liberalisation, the global 
increase in energy prices, and the recent disagreements between Europe’s main gas supplier and transit countries 
have exacerbated, for all actors, the feeling that gas businesses are increasingly risky. If the EU’s commitment to its 
20/20/20 targets by 2020 is really achieved, then the outlook for exporters to the EU may look rather grim. This is 
worrying not only for the suppliers but also for importers, because a gas bubble has already been building over the 
EU and has been exacerbated by the impact of the recession. At the same time, new import infrastructures (both by 
pipeline and via LNG) are mushrooming across the Union. As if these uncertainties were not enough, the worldwide 
financial and economic turmoil has already started to cause energy demand erosion. Producers and consumers are 
now facing extra challenges. On the one hand, the expected development of gas demand and import requirements in 
consuming countries are becoming more uncertain. On the other hand, the situation in gas exporting countries is 
getting critical. They are now struggling to sustain their export projects, and postponing or down-scaling their 
investment programmes.  
1.8 Russia 
Additional threats exist with regard to the EU's export partner’s infrastructure, investment and existing relationships 
with certain importing countries. In particular, gas imports from Russia are subject to a variety of potential 
disruptions. According to available estimates, in order to meet its obligations by 2020, Gazprom will have to 
seriously revamp and expand its gas transportation system, including the trunk pipelines and compressor systems, in 
order to maintain gas supply, potentially costing billions. In addition to infrastructure threats, broader threats exist 
between the EU and Russia. A mutual lack of trust and an attempt to guarantee one’s own security at the expense of 
the other have prevented the optimally functioning relationship that is in both regions’ overwhelming interest to 
pursue.  
1.9  Transit states and commercial disputes 
Gas exported from Russia has to cross states that can sometimes be unreliable. Belarus remains an important partner 
for Russia in its role as a transit state, although the relationship has ranged from exceptionally close to open hostility. 
Belarus has the capacity to transport 45 billion cubic meters of gas per year (BCM/Y) compared to 120 BCM/Y 
through the Ukraine. Obviously, the risks that are inherent in the transportation of gas through the Ukraine have been 
somewhat mitigated by the recent election results. In 2008, more than 120 BCM of Russian gas was transited 
through the Ukraine. The threats to such transit are threefold; first, the potential risk of a physical rupture via 
Ukraine; second, the threat of a monopolistic behaviour (transit fees and in general); and third, a country can fail to 
deliver across its border with the EU the whole volume of gas that entered across its border with Russia.         
Commercial disputes, such as the one between Russia and the Ukraine in 2009, remain a threat to the EU. The lack 
of a firm enforceable legal contract between the countries and the inability to reroute the gas transferred through the 
Ukraine means that such a threat cannot be ruled out in the future and is thus a principal area of concern for the EU. 
Additional geopolitical risks include the improper domestic management of gas consumption in export countries, 
which results in less gas available for export. This risk will likely increase unless some exporting countries take the 
necessary steps to increase their energy efficiency and remove existing subsidies for gas. Posing additional risk is the 
lack of investment in new upstream infrastructure. Algeria and Russia have been accused in recent years of 
insufficient investment in their upstream and export facilities. 
1.10 Political risk 
Political risk refers primarily to delaying or curtailing investments by creating an uncertain investment climate. As 
natural gas is dependent on complex and capital-intensive infrastructure with significant lead times, uncertainty 
created by political inertia in the energy sector can become a serious problem for security of supply. Investments are 
often interlinked with political decisions and may be subject to wider influence from seemingly diverse policy areas, 
including foreign policy and environmental considerations. Therefore, such decisions are necessarily complex and at 
times impeded by policy objectives in other areas. A lack of certainty as to what the outcome of a certain policy will 
be is often afflicts investment in gas infrastructure; if the political decision-making process is protracted, it will have 
a significant effect on decisions to invest in gas infrastructure, which require significant lead times and capital costs. 6 | Andrew Macintosh 
Security of demand is also subject to risk. Table 1 breaks down EU vulnerability to the evaluated risks and their 
respective impacts on security of supply. 
Table 1. EU vulnerability to evaluated risks and their impact 
 
High  
risk 
   
• Inadequate 
investments 
• Producer country 
policy 
• Transit, disputes and 
other risks 
 
 
 
Medium 
risk 
 
• Technical 
disruptions 
• Terrorism 
• Lack of reverse flow, 
commercial and 
technical 
• Market failures 
• Geopolitical 
• Insufficient upstream 
investments 
• Import 
diversification 
 
 
Low 
 risk 
 
 
• Inefficient SoS policy 
• Gas OPEC 
• Construction/ 
components failure 
• Self-induced gas 
disruption 
 
 
 
 
 
  Small  impact  Medium impact  Large impact 
 
2. Conclusions 
Security of supply and security of demand are complementary issues in ensuring balance in the EU’s natural gas 
supply. Security of supply requires improvements such as strengthening interconnections and increasing supply 
flexibility and diversification. 
Security of demand requires the EU to provide clearer signals regarding future gas demand in Europe to facilitate 
investment both internally and externally. Contradictory estimates in gas demand present a pertinent threat, as they 
cause exporters to underinvest in new supplies or fail to develop necessary new infrastructure. The result of the 
present lack of clarity within the EU and consequent underinvestment would lead to serious security of supply issues 
in natural gas that could not be solved in the short or medium terms.  
The possibility of an independent transmissions operator in Ukraine composed of Ukraine, the EU, and Russia 
should be seriously evaluated. Such cooperation would significantly enhance security of supply, reducing the 
chances of bilateral disputes affecting gas supply and ensuring much needed investment in Ukraine transmission 
infrastructure. While the technical constitution of such a tripartite operator may be complicated, the realisation of 
such a consortium could contribute greatly to EU gas security. 
National and regional differences imply that security of supply levels and mitigation tools will necessarily differ 
between countries and regions. The Baltic countries and parts of the south-east EU have significantly lower levels of 
security of supply and are subject to regional and country specific circumstances, which call for an overall EU 
security of supply policy that will allow for adjustment of measures and policies to specific regional circumstances. 
EU gas market development and liberalisation are not yet fully realised and there is a pressing concern to go ahead 
with these measures in order to ensure long-term gas supply security. National market structures in the EU remain 
highly concentrated, interconnection projects must be realised, and regulation should be clear and facilitate Security of Europe’s Gas Supply: EU Vulnerability | 7 
investments. Furthermore, gas prices in the EU should reflect long-term gas supply and demand. Legislation should 
be reviewed continually and the goal of creating a fully functioning gas market should be a focal point of legislators 
both nationally and across the EU.  
Traditional oil majors have realised that gas maintains a number of advantages over oil and have started shifting 
focus from oil to gas production. Natural gas offers greater long-term reserve growth, abundance and accessibility, 
lower production costs, stable economic returns, and lower technical and capital risk. In addition, environmental 
regulation favours a shift to gas production. The EU should seize this opportunity and provide clear policy signals 
and a stable regulatory environment to allow the EU to benefit from this commercial shift and ensure investments 
and other initiatives to increase the provision of security of supply.  
EU gas markets have been shown to invest in markets and not necessarily in security of supply. But markets alone 
will not solve the current issues of low security of supply in some countries, because in many member states markets 
are poorly or not at all developed, as is the case in the Baltic countries. The procrastination and prolonging of 
investment decisions in such regions further exacerbates security of supply. Thus increasing security of gas supply in 
these regions is likely to be dependent on government intervention and/or EU regulation.   
The potential of unconventional gas in Europe to significantly influence security of supply is presently unclear, and 
such resources should only be considered to have a potential impact in the medium to long term. Mass 
unconventional gas production in the United States has already had the indirect effect of increasing redirected LNG 
supply to Europe, but the potential production of unconventional gas in Europe, compared to that in the US, might 
be significantly more challenging owing to environmental impacts, population density, and the fact that the industry 
and knowledge of what resources are available in Europe are in their infancy. 
3.  Policy Recommendations  
Legislators and the oil and gas industry must cooperate more fully to ascertain how EU legislators can accommodate 
the increased focus on natural gas by large oil companies and how this focus can accommodate the quest for 
increased security of supply. 
Legislative coherency is crucial: the three main issues in energy markets – sustainability, market development and 
security of supply – should be addressed in a common form, whether through legislation, strategic review or some 
other means. 
Regional differences in security of supply call for policy measures and instruments that allow for regional security of 
supply initiatives. The model applied in the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) could be applied 
for this regional focus, allowing for resolute regional action. BEMIP was designed to ensure commitment from 
stakeholders, progress via incentive schemes, and political and legislative focus. 
Areas with a current low level of suppliers and routes require further diversification. This can be ensured by reverse 
flow and interconnection and new supply routes. 
A tripartite commission should be established for the Ukraine transit operator. 
Demand flexibility should be studied further as a means of mitigating EU security of supply risk. For instance, little 
is known about the EU’s potential to lessen the impact of a disruption by fuel switching in major power producers or 
large consumers. A study should be commissioned to ascertain the EU’s ability to do so in the event of a crisis.  
The EU needs to be more proactive and decisive in developing a policy toward regions that are expected to play a 
more important role in gas supply after 2030. With traditional suppliers such as Norway and Algeria expected to be 
deplete their supplies in the medium term, Europe must have a robust policy in the Caspian, Middle East and North 
African regions that shows pragmatism, partnership and commitment to their development as gas export partners. 
The EU should develop a gas demand forecast based on the amalgamation of energy policies and individual national 
plans. This work could be foreseen by ENTSOG, as the capacity forecasts made in the ten- year network 
development plan should be compared to and based on the national and overall development of natural gas 
consumption. 
Legislation regarding unconventional gas production should be streamlined and reviewed in order to speed up 
unconventional gas production in Europe and make sure any gaps regarding the law of its production are addressed. 
Additionally, an accurate survey of its potential production in Europe should be generated in order to evaluate its 
potential impact and elucidate recoverable resources. Any procrastination regarding the generation of an accurate 
survey of unconventional gas’s potential impact may have a detrimental effect on investment in medium- and long-
term infrastructure projects. About CEPS
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